Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements

Amihai Glazer, Vesa Kanniainen () and Panu Poutvaara ()
Additional contact information
Vesa Kanniainen: Department of Economics, University of Helsinki
Panu Poutvaara: Department of Economics, University of Helsinki

No 70818, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical consumers. Consequently, to affect a firm's ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care. In the firm's choice between ethical and unethical behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies depends on the cost of behaving ethically. In particular, when the cost is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a prisoners' dilemma as the firm's optimal strategy.

Keywords: Firm's ethical code; Consumer morality; Boycotts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-mic and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Informational benefits of international environmental agreements (2008)
Working Paper: Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:070818

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