The Enemy You Can't See: An Investigation of the Disruption of Dark Networks

Michael McBride () and David Hewitt

No 121307, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the optimal disruption of dark (covert and illegal) networks. Of central importance is that an interventionist will generally have incomplete information about the dark network's architecture. We derive the optimal disruption strategy in a stylized model of dark network intervention with incomplete information and show how it combines features of two types of disruption considered in the literature: random failure and targeted attacks. In particular, the optimal disruption strategy encourages greater risk as less of the architecture is observed. A laboratory experiment finds that subjects tasked with disrupting a dark network qualitatively mimic the theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Terrorism; Crime; Intervention; Defense (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D85 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2012-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: The enemy you can’t see: An investigation of the disruption of dark networks (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:121307

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