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A Constructive Proof of the Nash Bargaining Solution

Luís Carvalho

No 14-01, Working Papers Series 2 from ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL)

Abstract: This paper o ers a constructive proof of the Nash Bargaining solution. We start by proving that Nashs solution is representable based on its continuity. This property along with the linearity of the choice function will then allow us to identify the function representing Nashs bargaining choice. Finally, supported on the result for two players, we will generalize it to n-players.

Keywords: Nash Bargaining; Constructive Proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2014-05-22
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