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Multiplayer Bargaining with Delayed Agreement

Luís Carvalho ()

No 15-03, Working Papers Series 2 from ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL)

Abstract: The best known equilibrium strategies of multiplayer bargaining dene that the agreement is established at the rst moment. In this paper two new subgame perfect Nash equilibria strategies are proposed, one in which the agreement moment is delayed for T > 1 periods and one other in which the bargaining proposals proceed endlessly.

Keywords: Multiplayer; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
Date: 2015-04-20
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