The effect of range of outcomes and magnitude of rewards on lying behavior in anonymous dice-under-cup trials
Carlos Lourenco,
Sandra Maximiano and
Camilla Zallot
No 2022/03, Working Papers Department of Economics from ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract:
We examine the effect of changing the structure of the lying opportunity by conducting a laboratory experiment. In particular, we vary the range of possible false outcomes and the magnitude of rewards. We apply the dice-under-cup paradigm which uses anonymous dice rolls to record actual lying behavior by comparing the distribution of participants stated outcomes to the expected statistical distribution of dice roll outcomes. We find that although some small changes in lying behavior can be achieved with an increase in the possible range of outcomes and by exponentially increasing rewards, lying behavior is generally robust to changes in the lying opportunity structure. Our study concludes that lying behavior seems to be driven by the aim to achieve a certain payoff regardless of conditions.
Keywords: dice-under; cup experiment; lying behavior; moral preferences JEL Classification: C92; D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp032022
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