Decentralized Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment

Joana Pais (), Ágnes Pintér and Róbert Veszteg

No 2012/08, Working Papers Department of Economics from ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa

Abstract: We report data from controlled laboratory experiments on two-sided matching markets in which participants interact in a decentralized way, without having to refer to a central clearinghouse. Our treatments have been designed to evaluate the effect of information, search costs, and binding agreements on the final outcome and also on the individual strategies that lead to it. We find that these features affect the level and pace of market activity as well as the identity of those who receive proposals. While the lack of information alone does not reduce stability or efficiency, its combination with search costs can be detrimental.

Keywords: decentralized matching; experiments; stability; two-sided matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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