Positive and negative reciprocity in labor market

Paulo Pereira (), Nuno Silva and João Andrade e Silva

No 2002/03, Working Papers Department of Economics from ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa

Abstract: This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze whether reciprocal behavior survives in a more hostile environment than usually considered in the literature. In fact, positive reciprocity survives in a treatment favoring selfish behavior, although there is a decrease in the deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Besides positive reciprocity there is negative reciprocity in this new treatment. Additionally, this paper highlights the influence of the experimental design, namely the importance of wage cut points, on subjects' behavior.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Gift exchange games; Gift and offense exchange games; Incomplete contracts; Labor relations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Related works:
Journal Article: Positive and negative reciprocity in the labor market (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp32002

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