Zur Filterleistung von Hochschulsystemen - Bildungswege von Topmanagern in den USA, Frankreich und Deutschland

Egon Franck and Christian Opitz ()
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Christian Opitz: Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich

No 13, Working Papers from University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU)

Abstract: Starting with Arrow’s hypothesis that Higher Education is a filter, the paper studies three alternative filter-designs. These designs can be attributed to the Higher Education systems of three different countries: In the U.S., compe-tition between schools not only leads to a stable and stratified hierarchy of schools but also validates the degrees issued by these schools. In France, the state deliberately sets and validates a hierarchy of schools acting as a monitor and at the same time as an employer of high potentials. In spite of an other-wise egalitarian regulatory environment, in Germany professors still have incentives to economize on individual reputation. Due to the rather strong property rights of German professors, their doctoral students contribute to this reputation. The incentive to employ productive doctoral students may validate the doctoral degree as a signal for talent. A closer look at the educa-tional paths of top managers in the U.S., France, and Germany reveals results which are consistent with the theoretical conjectures.

Date: 2002
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Published in: Zeitschrift fuer betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung (ZfbF), 56, 2004, S. 72-86.

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Journal Article: Zur Filterleistung von Hochschulsystemen–Bildungswege von Topmanagern in den USA, Frankreich und Deutschland (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iso:wpaper:0013

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