Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues

Helmut Dietl, Tobias Duschl () and Markus Lang
Additional contact information
Tobias Duschl: Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich

No 129, Working Papers from University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU)

Abstract: Executive pay regulation is widely discussed as a measure to reduce financial mismanagement in corporations. We show that the professional team sports industry, the only industry with substantial experience in the regulation of compensation arrangements, provides valuable insights for the regulation of executive pay. Based on the experience from professional sports leagues, we develop implications for the corporate sector regarding the establishment and enforcement of executive pay regulation as well as the level, structure, and rigidity of such regulatory measures.

Keywords: Salary Caps; Executive Compensation; Corporate Governance; Financial Crisis; Financial Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G38 K23 M48 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2010-05, Revised 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/ISU_WPS/129_ISU_full.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues (2011)
Journal Article: Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues (2011)
Working Paper: Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues (2011)
Working Paper: Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iso:wpaper:0129

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by IBW IT ().