In Defense of Defect

Oscar Volij ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity.

Date: 2002-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior 2002, vol. 39, pp. 309-321

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:10125

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