Payoff Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk
Oscar Volij ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
This paper considers single item auctions in the private values framework, with buyers whose preferences satisfy the axioms of Yaari's (1987) dual theory of choice under risk. It is shown that when their valuations are independently distributed, risk averse buyers are indifferent among all the auctions contained in a large family of mechanisms that includes the standard auctions.
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Published in Economics Letters 2002, vol. 76 no. 2, pp. 231-237
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Journal Article: Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:10129
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