An Essay on Cooperative Bargaining in U.S. Agricultural Markets

Brent Hueth () and Philippe Marcoul ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the incidence and economic rationale for cooperative bargaining in U.S. agricultural markets. Bargaining is not just about increasing price paid to farmers; indeed, there is no empirical research indicating that cooperative bargaining has any direct influence on price. Nevertheless, the price negotiation process may be useful in itself as a form of price discovery in markets where there is uncertainty about market supply and demand conditions, and bargaining associations can play an important role in ensuring contract reliability. These and other benefits must be weighed against the organizational and on-going operational costs of a formal bargaining association when considering whether bargaining is appropriate for a given market environment. Even when the aggregate net benefits associated with bargaining are positive, the distribution of benefits across the various market participants may have an important influence on the political feasibility of bargaining.

Date: 2003-01-01
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Published in Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization 2003, vol. 1 no. 1

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