Political Economy of U. S. Wheat Legislation (The)

Bruce Babcock and Andrew Schmitz

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Both taxpayer subsidies to U.S. wheat producers and domestic deadweight losses increased as a result of the U.S. wheat program adopted in 1985. A calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative wheat policies shows that mandatory production controls with no taxpayer expense could have made wheat producers as well off as the adopted policy. Becker's theory of competition among interest groups and Peltzman's theory of the equilibrium amount of regulation are shown to be consistent with the observed policy choice if the list of affected interest groups includes agricultural input suppliers and grain marketing firms.

Date: 1990-04-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Economic Inquiry, April 1990, vol. 28, pp. 335-352

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Economy of U.S. Wheat Legislation (1990)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:10591

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().