Cac Versus Incentive-Based Instruments in Agriculture: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program

Hongli Feng, Catherine Kling, Lyubov Kurkalova () and Silvia Secchi

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we examine command-and-control (CAC) policies and market-based instruments (MBI) in the context of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The CRP, an MBI in the form of subsidies, is by far the largest agro-environmental policy implemented to date. We compare the environmental performance of the CRP as implemented to a few counterfactual CAC polices using EPIC (Environmental Policy Integrated Climate), a bio-physical simulation model. In the context of multiple environmental indicators, no policy alternative emerges as a clear winner. The importance of the choice and design of CAC policies is emphasized. Keywords: command-and-control policy, Conservation Reserve Program, market-based instrument.

Date: 2007-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-res
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:10796

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