Dynamic Costly State Verification

Cheng Wang

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: I study a model of dynamic risk sharing with costly state verification (CSV). In the model, a risk neutral agent enters an infinitely repeated relationship with a risk averse agent. In each period, the risk averse agent receives a random income which is observed only by himself, unless the risk neutral agent engages in costly monitoring. I provide a set of characterizations for the optimal contract, and I show that CSV has interesting effects on the long run distribution of the agents' expected utilities.

Date: 2005-01-01
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Published in Economic Theory 2005, vol. 25 no. 4, pp. 887-916

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