A Stability Theorem for Symmetrically Rational Counterplanning

Robert E. Kalaba, K. Spingarn and Leigh Tesfatsion ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In the absence of contrary information, it would seem prudent for a competitor to attribute to his opponents the same level of rationality that he himself employs. In the context of a general linear-quadratic nonzero-sum two-person game, it is shown that a counterplanning procedure consistent with this principle of symmetrical rationality always converges to the unique Nash equilibrium for the game. Annotated pointers to related work can be accessed here: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/vita.home#Game

Keywords: Nonzero-sum two-person game; symmetrical rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1982-01-01
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Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 1982, vol. 37, pp. 379-385

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:11214

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