C^3 Modelling With Symmetrical Rationality

Leigh Tesfatsion ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In the absence of contrary information, it would seem prudent for competitors to attribute to their opposition the same level of rationality they attribute to themselves. Using a simple but interesting C^3 (command, control, and communication) problem for illustration, a method is proposed for incorporating symmetrical rationality without resorting to the general multistage game framework which has proved difficult to apply in practice. A "criterion filtering" technique is then proposed for the approximate solution of the resulting model which does not require integration operations and which appears to be especially well suited for C^3 problems with finite admissible control sets. Annotated pointers to related work can be accessed here: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/cfhome.htm

Keywords: N-person game; symmetrical rationality; criterion filtering; Command; control; communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1980-01-01
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Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation 1980, vol. 6, pp. 51-61

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:11227

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