Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

David Frankel, Stephen Morris and Ady Pauzner

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. Te surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.

Date: 2003-01-01
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory 2003,, pp. 1-44

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Journal Article: Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities (2003)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (2003)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (2001)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (2000)
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