Firm Relocation Threats and Copy Cat Costs

Darin Wohlgemuth and Maureen Kilkenny

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: To retain firms, states are forgiving billions of dollars in tax liabilities. Some firms move even after a relief package is offered; other firms obtain tax concessions by bluffing. When firms threaten to relocate unless their tax burden is lightenend, what should a local government do? If it offers relief, at best it retains the firm, but it also encourages other firms ("copy cats") to demand similar treatment. At worst, it loses the firm and has to deal with the additional threats. Tax incentive packages can cost much more than the foregone revenues related to the single threatening firm. We solve a local government's constrained optimization problem to identify its optimal response in a game-theoretic framework with asymmetric information. Individual recruitment is modeled as a sealed-bid process in which the government does not know what alternative tax pachage(s) may be offerred to the firm. We show that the probability of a relief offer being the optimal response is positively related to the rate of expansion and indirect revenue (income and sales taxes related to activity in the locale) and negatively related to copy cat costs and the magnitude of tax relief. The problem is analyzed theoretically and graphically. The choice rules are related to other empirical work and illustrated numerically.

Date: 1998-01-01
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Published in International Regional Science Review 1998, vol. 21 no. 2, pp. 139-162

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Related works:
Journal Article: Firm Relocation Threats and Copy Cat Costs (1998)
Working Paper: Firm Relocation Threats and Copy Cat Costs (1996)
Working Paper: Firm Relocation Threats and Copy Cat Costs (1996)
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