Consequences of Co-Benefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs, The
Hongli Feng and
Catherine Kling ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
In this paper, we study the social efficiency of private carbon markets that include trading in agricultural soil carbon sequestration when there are significant cobenefits (positive environmental externalities) associated with the practices that sequester carbon. Likewise, we investigate the efficiency of government run conservation programs that are designed to promote a broad array of environmental attributes (both carbon sequestration and its cobenefits) for the supply of carbon. Finally, policy design and efficiency issues associated with the potential interplay between a private carbon market and a government conservation program are studied. Empirical analyses for an area that represents a significant potential source of carbon sequestration and its associated cobenefits illustrate the magnitude and complexity of these issues in real world policy design.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-ene and nep-env
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Published in Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, December 2005, vol. 53 no. 4, pp. 461-476
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Journal Article: The Consequences of Cobenefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs (2005)
Working Paper: Consequences of Co-benefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs, The (2005)
Working Paper: The Consequences of Cobenefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12269
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