Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts

Wallace Huffman and Richard Just

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Explores landowner-tenant contracts in land tenure in agriculture. Inefficiency of share tenancy relative to owner cultivation; Introduction of principal-agent models; Influence of monitoring in studying optimal landowner-tenant risk sharing; Need to study adequate tenant incentives

Date: 2004-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 2004, vol. 52, pp. 617-643

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Journal Article: Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts (2004)
Working Paper: Implications of Agency Theory for Optimal Land Tenure Contracts (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12337

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