Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types
Yossi Spiegel and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jacques Crémer ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the biddersï¾’ values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is in general impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability.
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Published in Economics Letters, October 2006, vol. 93 no. 1, pp. 94-100
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Journal Article: Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12663
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