Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions

Charles Zheng

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A model of English auction that allows jump bidding is proposed. When two objects are sold separately via such English auctions, I construct an equilibrium such that bidders signal via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the prices without relying on any central mediator. This equilibrium eliminates the exposure problem for a bidder whose valuation function is superadditive. Consequently, the auction game overly concentrates the goods to a multi-item bidder and never overly diffuses them to single-item bidders.

Keywords: complementarity; auction; multiple object aucrtions; simultaneous auctions; synergy; exposure problem; threshold problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:12698

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