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Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory

Wallace Huffman and Richard Just

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Abstract not available.

Date: 1998-08-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory (2000)
Working Paper: Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory (1998) Downloads
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