Preferences Over Valuation Distributions in Auctions

David Hennessy

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Sellers auctioning items use advertisements and location to generate interest. They seek a rightward shift in the ex-ante distribution of bidder valuations. We characterize distribution pairs such that all more-is-better expected utility maximizing sellers in preference-revealing auctions prefer the same distribution.

Date: 2000-07-01
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Published in Economics Letters, July 2000, vol. 68, pp. 55-59

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