Incomplete Adoption of a Superior Innovation

Harvey Lapan and GianCarlo Moschini

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a model in which an innovating monopolist of a technologically superior intermediate input must sell this product to final output producers. Prior research shows that, with complete information, the monopolist's optimal strategy will lead to complete adoption of this technologically superior innovation. In this article we show that, when the price of some competitively supplied input used in the final product market is endogenous and is altered by adoption of the innovation, then the optimal pricing strategy of the monopolist may lead to incomplete innovation. Thus, the standard result of complete adoption of the superior technology is partly attributable to the partial equilibrium nature of prior models.

Date: 2000-11-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Economica, November 2000, vol. 67 no. #268, pp. 525-542

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Journal Article: Incomplete Adoption of a Superior Innovation (2000)
Working Paper: Incomplete Adoption of a Superior Innovation (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:1738

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