Buyback Programs in Commercial Fisheries: Efficiency Versus Transfers

Quinn Weninger () and Kenneth McConnell ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A Cournot model of investment is used to characterize the pre- and post-buyback investment equilibrium for vessels operating in a total-allowable-catch-regulated fishery. Welfare effects-the net welfare gains or losses and the distributional effects-that may be expected from vessel buyback programs are identified. Net welfare effects depend on the ability of remaining vessels to replace buyback capital, the speed of capital replacement, and capital investment irreversibility. Net welfare effects are likely to be positive only under exceptional technological and capital-market conditions. A brief review of the British Columbia Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan is presented to anchor the theoretical model.

Date: 2000-05-01
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Published in Canadian Journal of Economics, May 2000, vol. 33 no. 2, pp. 394-412

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Journal Article: Buyback programs in commercial fisheries:efficiency versus transfers (2000)
Journal Article: Buyback programs in commercial fisheries: effciency versus transfers (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:1834

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