On the Long-Run Efficiency of Auctioned vs. Free Permits
Catherine Kling () and
Jinhua Zhao ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
When marketable emission permits affect the entry and exit decisions of competitive firms, all permits should not be distributed free of charge. Depending on the nature of the pollutant, an optimal share of the permits should be auctioned with others freely distributed to ensure long-run efficiency. All of the permits should be auctioned for global pollutants, but for local pollutants, some of the permits should be free.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Economics Letters, November 2000, vol. 69 no. 2, pp. 235-38
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
Journal Article: On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:1836
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().