Spousal Conflict and Divorce
Oleksandr Zhylyevskyy ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
The optimal balance between keeping marriages intact, despite spousal conflict, and allowing for divorce is a subject of policy debate in the United States. To explore the tradeoffs, I construct a structural model with information asymmetries, which may generate inefficient outcomes. Parameters are estimated using data from the National Survey of Families and Households. I find that eliminating separation periods decreases the conflict rate by 9.2% of its baseline level and increases the divorce rate by 4.0%. Perfect child support enforcement decreases the frequency of conflict and divorce by 2.7% and 21.2%, respectively, and reduces the incidence of inefficient divorces.
Keywords: spousal conflict; divorce; separation period requirements; child support enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D13 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem
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Published in Journal of Labor Economics, October 2012, vol. 30 no. 4, pp. 915-962
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Journal Article: Spousal Conflict and Divorce (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:34813
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