Unfunded Pensions and Endogenous Labor Supply

Joydeep Bhattacharya and Torben M Andersen

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A classic result in dynamic public economics states that there is no welfare rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions in a dynamically-efficient neoclassical economy with exogenous labor supply. Parenthetically, a welfare justification for PAYG pensions exists if the economy is dynamically inefficient. Under a sufficient condition that the old be no less risk-averse than the young, these results extend to an economy with endogenous labor supply.

Keywords: social security; dynamic efficiency; pay-as-you-go; Diamond model; endogenous labor supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-10
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Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics, June 2013, vol. 17 no. 5, pp. 971-997

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http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/papers/p14912-2012-02-10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: UNFUNDED PENSIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LABOR SUPPLY (2013)
Working Paper: Unfunded Pensions and Endogenous Labor Supply (2013)
Working Paper: Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply (2012)
Working Paper: Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:34912

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