Preferential Partner Selection in Evolutionary Labor Markets: A Study in Agent-Based Computational Economics

Leigh Tesfatsion ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper reports on computational experiments for an agent-based computational economics (ACE) model of a labor market with choice and refusal of contractual partners and endogenously evolving work-site behavior. Three types of labor market structures are examined: two-sided markets comprising workers and employers; partially fluid markets comprising pure workers, pure employers, and agents capable of functioning both as workers and as employers; and endogenous type markets in which each agent is capable of functioning as both a worker and an employer. Particular attention is focused focused on experimentally determined correlations between market structure and the formation and evolution of contractual networks and between contractual network formation and the types of work-site interactions and social welfare outcomes that these contractual networks support. Related work can be accessed at: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm

Keywords: Labor market; evolutionary game; partner choice; endogenous network formation; market structure; Agent-based test bed (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B40 C6 C7 D4 E2 E6 J2 J6 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-03-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Working Paper: Preferential Partner Selection in Evolutionary Labor Markets: A Study in Agent-Based Computational Economics (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:4063

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