International Charity Under Asymmetric Information

Maureen Kilkenny and Marie-Françoise Calmette

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: International charity is often subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We show that the burden of informational asymmetries are borne by the most needy countries, even when charities design incentive contracts which limit the rents that some countries can extract.

Date: 2001-12-20
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Published in Economics Letters, December 2001, vol. 74 no. 1, pp. 107-111

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:5112

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