A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules
Oscar Volij (),
Nir Dagan () and
Roberto Serrano ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with a bilateral principle, yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a result of a unique outcome of Nash equilibria. The result holds for a large class of consistent and monotone rules, including the Constrained Equal Award, the Propositional Rule, and many other well known rules. Moreover, all of the subgame perfect equilibria are coalition-proof in the associated game in strategic form.
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior 1997, vol. 18, pp. 55-72
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Journal Article: A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules (1997)
Working Paper: A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules (1997)
Working Paper: A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:5130
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