Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs Without Independence
Oscar Volij ()
Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
R. J. Aumann and A. Brandenburger (1995) provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that their result can be generalized to the case where players' preferences over uncertain outcomes belong to a large class of nonexpected utility preferences. (c) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, August 1996, vol. 70 no. 2, pp. 391-406
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Journal Article: Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:5169
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