A Class Of Social Choice Mechanisms Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilbria

Roy Gardner

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A class of social choice mechanisms is described. Each mechanism in the class, when viewed as a noncooperative game, is shown to possess at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Some members of the class are useful in social choice applications.

Date: 1977-04-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dr.lib.iastate.edu/server/api/core/bitstre ... b10e196f0f19/content
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genstf:197704010800001056

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().