Game-Theoretic Remarks on Gibbard's Libertarian Social Choice Functions

Roy Gardner

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Gibbard [4) has recently introduced a Pareto-consistent libertarian claim, designed to explicate Sen's Liberal Paradox [9]. The question this paper asks is whether all—or any—social choice functions satisfying Gibbard's claim are worthily of libertarian approval. This paper argues that there is a unique such social choice function.

Date: 1980-01-01
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