To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That Is The Question

Harvey Lapan and Todd Sandler

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We use economic analysis in a simple game-theory framework to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. From the government viewpoint, we examine both the choice of deterrence expenditure (i.e., expense meant to reduce terrorist logistical success during incidents) and whether to negotiate or not.

Date: 1988-05-01
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Journal Article: To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question (1988)
Working Paper: To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question (1988)
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