Central Mandates and Local Incentives: The Colombia Education Voucher Program

Elizabeth King, Peter Orazem and Darin R. Wohlgemuth

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In decentralized education systems programs that promote central mandates may have to be devolved to local governments, communities, and providers. When participation by local governments and providers is voluntary rather than compulsory, the determinants of program placement are important in predicting potential benefits to individuals. This article analyzes incentives for municipalities and private schools to participate in Colombia's voucher program. It finds that the demand for secondary education relative to the capacity of public schools and the availability of spaces in private schools in the municipality were key predictors of municipal participation, whereas the number of underserved students had a nonlinear effect on participation. Schools whose educational quality was moderate and charged moderate tuition fees were the most likely to participate; the program was less attractive to schools whose quality and fees were high and to schools whose quality and fees were low.

Date: 1999-01-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Central Mandates and Local Incentives: The Colombia Education Voucher Program (1999)
Working Paper: Central Mandates and Local Incentives: The Colombia Education Voucher Program (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genstf:199901010800001337

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