Strategic environmental policy under free trade with transboundary pollution
Shiva Sikdar and
Harvey Lapan
ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We analyze the effects of free trade on environmental policies in a strategic setting with transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental outcomes, making both countries worse off. With command and control policies (quotas), there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable permits, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. In our model carbon leakage alone, and not a terms of trade motive, drives countries to relax domestic environmental policy. Quantity-based tools strictly welfare-dominate price-based tools under free trade.
Date: 2007-10-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution (2011) 
Working Paper: Strategic environmental policy under free trade with transboundary pollution (2011) 
Working Paper: Strategic environmental policy under free trade with transboundary pollution (2010) 
Working Paper: Strategic Environmental Policy Under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution (2008) 
Working Paper: Strategic Environmental Policy Under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution (2007) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genstf:200710010700001168
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