Setting incentives for collaboration among agricultural scientists: application of principal-agent theory to team work

Wallace Huffman

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The USDA is attempting to shift more research funds into competitive grants involving collaboration across disciplines on large projects. This type of research structure raises a host of information and incentive issues. The objective of this paper is to shed new light on principal-agent problems that are likely to arise in this new funding structure.

Date: 2010-06-22
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Working Paper: Setting Incentives for Collaboration Among Agricultural Scientists: Application of Principal-Agent Theory to Team Work (2010)
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