Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries

Adriana Valcu-Lisman and Quinn Weninger ()

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a general, dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-Perfect equilibrium harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. These findings provide new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.

Date: 2012-09-26
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Related works:
Working Paper: Markov-Perfect Rent Dissipation in Rights-Based Fisheries (2013)
Working Paper: Markov-Perfect Rent Dissipation in Rights-Based Fisheries (2013)
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