The impact of deposit insurance on depositor behavior during a crisis: A conjoint analysis approach
Glenn Boyle (),
Roger D. Stover,
Amrit Tiwana and
ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics
We investigate the effectiveness of initiating deposit insurance at the outset of a banking crisis. Using a conjoint analysis approach that allows us to consider the simultaneous impact of multiple deposit insurance attributes and various counterfactuals, we ask a multinational sample of respondents how they would view hypothetical account profiles following the failure of a large competing bank. Previous experience matters: respondents from countries without explicit deposit insurance exhibit greater withdrawal risk, suggesting that the introduction of deposit insurance during a crisis may be only partially successful in preventing bank runs. They also impose a higher deposit interest rate premium. Having a long-term bank relationship reduces withdrawal risk, as does the absence of co-insurance.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art ... ontext=econ_las_pubs
Journal Article: The impact of deposit insurance on depositor behavior during a crisis: A conjoint analysis approach (2015)
Working Paper: The Impact of Deposit Insurance on Depositor Behavior During a Crisis: A Conjoint Analysis Approach (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genstf:201501010800001042
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Curtis Balmer ().