Acquired Skills and Learned Abilities: Wage Dynamics of Blue-collar Workers in Internal Labor Markets

Masaki Nakabayashi

No f153, ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) from Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo

Abstract: Workers' abilities are hidden information. Thus, when hiring, firms first use education as a proxy for abilities, and then learn about workers' abilities by tracking products. If this learning is asymmetric inside and outside major firms' internal labor markets, the market expects work experience and schooling to be complements for experience before workers gain long-term employment, which hides the learning effect. Once workers gain longterm employment, the learning effect becomes evident. Furthermore, the employer learns more quickly in the early stages of internal career, and this privately learned information could improve the efficiency of in-house training programs.

Keywords: asymmetric employer learning; cross-sectional skill distribution, longitudinal employer learning, internal labor markets. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 L22 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2011-02, Revised 2015-01-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/publishments/dpf/pdf/f-153.pdf Revised version, April 2014 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:itk:issdps:f153

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