Price, Quality, and Organization: Branding in the Japanese silk-reeling industry

Masaki Nakabayashi

No f160, ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) from Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo

Abstract: Transaction costs depend on the degree of informational asymmetry in trading goods. This environment provides commitment to certain quality with an opportunity to earn quality premium given the degree of asymmetry. A device of commitment to quality could be inspection and branding either by a trader or manufacturer. In the market of raw silk, the largest export of Japan from the late nineteenth century, informational asymmetry between Japan and the Western destinations was serious and Western trading companies dominated quality control by the mid-1880s. Then, Japanese manufacturers internalized inspection and branding processes, earned quality premium, and began rapid growth.

Keywords: Institutions; asymmetric information of quality; branding; textile industry; Japan. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L22 L23 N35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2012-04, Revised 2013-03-21
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http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/publishments/dpf/pdf/f-160.pdf Revised version, Jan. 2013 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:itk:issdps:f160

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