Legacy of Czar: The Russian Dual System of Schooling and Signaling
Aigerim Zhangaliyeva and
Masaki Nakabayashi ()
No f163, ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) from Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo
Employers use the educational background as a signal of workers' latent abilities. This signaling effect decreases as employers learn about workers' abilities as the workers acquire work experience. The effect results in a negative coefficient of the interaction term between schooling and experience in a wage equation. Meanwhile, if schooling and experience are complements, it affects the coefficient in the other way. We expect the latter effect is more significant in case of the vocational schooling. Using a Russian dataset, we show that employer learning is more weakly observed for graduates of vocational tertiary schools than those of general tertiary schools. The results might apply to other European countries that have adopted the dual system of general and vocational schooling.
Keywords: European dual system; vocational schooling, employer learning; schooling and experience complementarity; Russia. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I26 J31 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2013-09-26, Revised 2019-09-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:itk:issdps:f163
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