An Efficiency Comparison of City Managers and Elected Mayors

Steven Kreft ()

No 2007-02, Working Papers from Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Previous research has concluded that there are no efficiency differences between elected mayor-council (EMC) and council-manager (CM) city governments. However, the CM form has recently surpassed the EMC form to become the most popular U.S. city government. This paper provides an alternative method of testing the relative efficiency of the two forms of government. Relying on capitalization theory of local public goods, I develop a hedonic price model for Ohio metropolitan home sales. Results show that houses within a CM city have a pricing premium that can be attributed to the relative efficiency of the CM government.

Keywords: city manager; government efficiency; local public goods; hedonic; capitalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H4 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2007-02

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