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Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond

John Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen ()

No 2013-11, Working Papers from Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Antitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain how exclusive dealing could possibly cause harm, and have modelled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.

JEL-codes: K21 L0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hme, nep-hpe and nep-law
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