Principal-Agent Theory and Nonprofit Accountability

Richard Steinberg

Working Papers from Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Department of Economics

Abstract: This synthetic literature review briefly summarizes general literature on principalagent problems, then shows how this literature has been or can be adapted to look at nonprofit governance, accountability, and performance. It concludes with discussions of differences between agency problems in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors and difficulties in developing normative theories of accountability.

Keywords: Principal Agent theory; Contract Failure; Nonprofit Organizations; Privately-Provided Public Good; Fundraising; Donations; Incentive Compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 H41 L30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71 pages
Date: 2008-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iup:wpaper:wp200803

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