Multi-level evolution in games

Fernando Vega Redondo and José Canals Cerdá
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Fernando Vega Redondo: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas
José Canals Cerdá: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Fernando Vega-Redondo

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze a generalization of the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath, & Rob (1991) where the population is partitioned into disjoint groups and evolution takes place "in parallel" at the following two levels: (i) within groups, at the lower level; among groups, at the higher one. Unlike in their context, efficiency considerations always overcome those of risk-dominance in the process of selecting the long-ron equilibrium in large populations. From a normative viewpoint, this suggests the potential importance of "decentralization", here understood as local and independent interaction.

Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1992-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1992-10

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