ON THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN GENERAL GAMES OF COMMON INTEREST

Fernando Vega Redondo
Additional contact information
Fernando Vega Redondo: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Fernando Vega-Redondo

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: This paper investigates an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection in which agents are randomly paired every period to play some general symrnetric game of common interest (i.e., a game where some strategy profile Pareto- dominates al1 other configurations). Along the process, players tend to imitate the strategy (or strategies) which currently yield the highest average payoff. Occasionally, they also experiment with arbitrarily chosen strategies. In the long run, if the rate of experimentation is small, the population ends up playing the uniquely efficient strategy profile "most of the time". Moreover, the convergence to such state of affairs is relatively fast, independently of population size.

Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1993-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published by Ivie

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1993-11.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1993 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1993-11

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Departamento de Edición ().